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NOTES AND COMMENTS
It is stated in a federal case in Indiana involving the same statute
that Congress did not intend to include the offense of obtaining money
under false pretenses in the statute, for it did not expressly provide
for that offense.2 5  This holding is an example of the same statute
being given a strict interpretation. If the indictment had been as in
the present case the defendant could have been convicted, for the writing
of a bad check is a felony under the Indiana law.
2 6 A like result was
reached in a Pennsylvania case where the defendant was released be-
cause his act of giving a forged check did not constitute either larceny
or a federal felony ;2T but had he merely been indicted for intending to
give a forged check he would have been within the present interpreta-
tion of the statute, for forgery is a felony under the Pennsylvania
Code.28  These decisions would tend to show that other judges and
prosecuting officers are not completely in accord with the interpretation
given in the present case, and the possibility of having non-uniform
offenses against the federal government might make it wise either to
rewrite the law, indicating freely the intention of Congress, or to in-
terpret the statute so that it covers only felonies under the federal law.
Certiorari has recently been granted 29 in a case concerning the same
issue involved in the instant decision, and an authoritative ruling may
soon be forthcoming. C. D. HOGUE, JR.
Marine Insurance-Return of Excess Premiums-Innocent
Overvaluaion-Risk Bearing in Transoceanic Shipments
A pearl necklace, left in Germany upon the death of the owner, was
adjudged by a German "official protocol" to be worth $60,000, and
was sought to be obtained from Germany by the executors of the estate
§1167; ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack, 1939), Art. 27, §§152 and 150. Virginia and
West Virginia both have distinctions as to when the offense is a felony or a
misdemeanor; Virginia turning the offense into larceny and making distinction
between grand and petit larceny at $5.00t; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936)
§4149(44), grand larceny being a felony, id. §4758. It is thus possible to commit
the same crime within the same circuit and be guilty of an offense against the
United States if it is committed in one part, and not guilty if committed in an-
other part. There would not seem to be any apparent reason why the cashing of
a check in a national bank would impair its efficiency more in one state so as to
make it an offense against the United States than in another where it would be no
offense against the United States.
" United States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596 (N. D. Ind. 1940). Here the
indictment was for larceny by trick, and the court held that the defendant could
not be convicted because there was consent to the taking of the title and the
possession of the money.
-" IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §§10-2105, and 9-101.
2T United States v. Patton, 120 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941) (indictment
was for larceny, but the court held that the bank relinquished title and possession
when it cashed the forged check and thus it could not be larceny).
28 18 PENNA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) §3611.
"Jerome v. United States, 11 U. S. L. WEEK 3106 (U. S. 1942).
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and the heir. A war-risk insurance policy was taken out against loss
in transit of the pearls, "valued at . . . [$60,000]." Premiums of over
$2,000 were paid. Upon its arrival the necklace was found to be
worth only a little more than $60.00, the German "official protocol"
allegedly being incorrect in stating its value. Executors therefore sue
to recover the excessive premiums paid the insurance company, basing
their suit on a count for "money had and received," and also requesting
reformation of the insurance policy. Held: Recovery denied. Equity
will reform a contract when it does not state what the parties intended,
but will not create a new and entirely different contract. Here there
is no indication of intent to obtain a lesser amount of insurance than
$60,000 worth. Also, the insurance company has rendered considera-
tion worth all the premium paid, for if the necklace had been lost at
sea the true value of it would never have been known, and the insurer
would have had to pay the $60,000 loss.'
Practically all of the decisions (certainly the important ones) con-
cerning overvaluation of the protected property by the insured have
dealt with a situation in which a loss of the property has occurred, and
the insurer is seeking to resist payment because of an alleged over-
valuation. The present case differs in that the risk has terminated
without a loss of the protected property so that insured is seeking to
recover excess premiums paid because of mistaken overvaluation rather
than to obtain indemnification. However, despite the factual peculiar-
ity of the present case, a knowledge of the law as set down in the
ordinary overvaluation decision is important background for the under-
standing of this case.
The effect of overstating the value of insured property has under-
gone a rather obvious change in the past century. 'The earlier cases
abided by the rule that even an absolutely innocent and unintentional
overstatement by the insured, if it were a material and substantial over-
statement, would avoid2 * the policy.3 This rule put the duty squarely
Orient Insurance Co. v. Dunlap, 193 Ga. 241, 17 S. E. (2d) 703 (1941).
'* See VANCE, INSURANCE (2nd ed. 1930) 360 n. 72.
When used with reference to insurance policies, the words "void," "vitiate,"
and similar language are generally used in decisions and texts not to mean void
ab initio, but rather "voidable at the option of the injured party." Since most
insurance cases arise from an attempt by the insurer to resist performance, so
that the insurer will always exercise any option he may have to avoid the policy,
the distinction between "void" and "voidable" is usually immaterial. In the
present case, though, the distinction might be of prime importance. If this policy
were void ab initio the insured here would have a much easier case for the return
of his premiums than if the policy were merely voidable at the option of the
insurer, since obviously the insurer does not elect to avoid. See infra, pp. 94 f., to
the effect that insured might recover in the present case, notwithstanding the
fact that the insurer has not exercised his option to avoid.
' Carpenter v. Providence Insurance Co., 16 Peters (U. S.) 495, 10 L. ed.
1044 (1842); Smith v. Royal Insurance Co., 37 F. Supp. 841 (N. D. Cal. 1941);
Carrolton Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 115 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2nd,
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upon the insured in all cases to find out the value of the goods he
wished to have insured, and to state same to the insurer accurately,
upon pain of being unable to recover for injury to or loss of the prop-
erty even to the extent of the smaller true value of it.
The modem cases have looked the other way-so that today the
majority rule may be said to be that an innocent mistake, even to a
substantial amount, will not cause a policy to be void.4  It would seem
that under the modern rule neither insured nor insurer would be greatly
interested in whether or not the protected property were overvalued.
However, the insurer may be anxious to avoid overstatement so as to
cut down the "moral hazard." And the insured is of course anxious
to avoid paying too high a premium.
1902); Carpenter v. American Insurance Co., 1 Story 57, Fed. Cas. No. 2428
(C. C. D. R. I. 1839) ; National Insurance Co. v. Duncan, 44 Colo. 472, 98 Pac.
634, 20 L. R. A. (N. s.) 340 (1908) ; Continental Insurance Co. v. Farlan, 219 Ky.
462, 293 S. W. 952 (1927); Niagara Insurance Co. v. Layne, 162 Ky. 665, 172
S. W. 1090 (1915); Protection Insurance Co. v. Hall, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 411
(1854); Dennison v. Thomaston Insurance Co., 20 Me. 125 (1841); Wood v.
Fireman's Insurance Co., 126 Mass. 316 (1879); Wilbur v. Bowditch Insurance
Co., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 446 (1852); Davenport v. New England Insurance Co.,
6 Cush. (Mass.) 340 (1849); Houghton v. Insurance Co., 8 Metc. (Mass.) 114
(1844); Bryant v. Ocean Insurance Co., 22 Pick (Mass.) 200 (1838); Stetson
v. Massachusetts Insurance Co., 4 Mass. 330 (1808); Shelden v. Michigan In-
surance Co., 124 Mich. 303, 82 N. W. 1068 (1900) ; Briggs v. Fireman's Insurance
Co., 65 Mich. 55, 31 N. W. 616 (1887); Smith v. Automobile Insurance Co., 188
Mo. App. 297, 175 S. W. 113 (1915); Leach v. Insurance Co., 58 N. H. 245
(1883); 'Hersey v. Merrimack Insurance Co., 7 Fost. (N. H.) 149 (1855);
Armour v. Transatlantic Insurance Co., 90 N. Y. 450 (1882) ; Evans v. Columbia
Insurance Co., 40 Misc. 316, 81 N. Y. Supp. 933 (1903); Bobbit v. Liverpool
Insurance Co., 66 N. C. 70 (1871); Lexington Insurance Co. v. Paver, 16 Ohio
324 (1847); Nassauer v. Susquehanna Insurance Co., 109 Pa. St. 507 (1885);
Catron v. Tennessee Insurance Co., 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 176 (1845); Home In-
surance Co. v. Eakin, 2 Tex. Civ. Cas. §665 (1885); Boutelle v. Westchester
Fire Insurance Co., 51 Vt. 431 (1878) ; Ionides v. Pender, L. R. 9 Q. B. 531
(Eng. 1882); Newton v. Gore Insurance Co., 33 U. C. (C. P.) 92 (Eng. 1875);
Riach v. Niagara Insurance Co., 21 U. P. (C. P.) 464 (Eng. 1861); Dickson v.
Equitable Fire Insurance Co., 18 U. C. (Q. B.) 246 (Eng. 1859) ; Shaw v. St.
Lawrence Insurance Co., 11 U. C. (Q. B.) 73 (Eng. 1851); Continental Insur-
ance Co. v. Ware, 9 Ins. L. J. 519 (1876).
'First National Bank v. Hartford Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 673, 24 L. ed. 563
(1877) ; Franklin Insurance Co. v. Vaughan, 92 U. S. 516, 23 L. ed. 740 (1876) ;
Hartford Live Stock Insurance Co. v. McMillen, 9 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 6th,
1925); Columbian Insurance Co. v. Modern Laundry, 277 Fed. 355 (C. C. A.
8th, 1921) ; Miller v. Alliance Insurance Co., 7 Fed. 649 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1881) ;
Atlas Insurance Co. v. Robison, 94 Ark. 390, 127 S. W. 456 (1910); Cottam v.
National Church Insurance Co., 209 Ill. App. 404 (1918) ; Home Insurance Co. v.
Overturf, 35 Ind. App. 361, 74 N. E. 47 (1905) ; Dwelling House Insurance Co.
v. Freeman, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 894, 15 S. W. 856 (1891); Garnier v. Aetna In-
surance Co., 181 La. 426, 159 So. 705 (1935) ; German Fire Insurance Co. v.
Cohen, 114 Md. 130, 78 A. 911 (1910); Bernadich v. Lincoln Mutual Insurance
Co., 287 Mich. 137, 283 N. W. 5 (1938) ; Mississippi Fire Insurance Co. v. Dixon,
133 Miss. 570, 98 So. 101 (1923); Delaware Insurance Co. v. Hill, 127 S. W.
283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910); Morotock Insurance Co. v. Fostoria Glass Co., 94 Va.
361, 26 S. E. 850 (1897); see especially Lynchburg Insurance Co. v. West, 76
Va. 575 (1882). See comment (1941) 19 LEHiGH LAW JoURN. 139.
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A few of even the very early cases did follow the "modern" rule,
and these gradually became more and more numerous. It appears that
the very first reported American case to offer a faint suggestion of
what ultimately became the modern rule was Wolcott v. Eagle Insur-
ance Company,5 . in 1827. Plaintiff operated a brig and was away
from the home port for many months at a time, making many stops in
distant lands. The value of the cargo was great at times and small at
times. " Plaintiff had stated that the average value was around $2,500,
and defendant insurer issued him a policy in that amount. At the time
of the loss sued on, the insured part of the cargo was worth consider-
ably less than $2,500. The case turned on other questions than the
one of valuation, but the counsel for plaintiff interposed the argument
that "Where the assured in a valued policy has anything at risk under
the policy, there being no fraud, the valuation is conclusive." The
Wolcott case was then cited by counsel in Borden v. Hingham Fire
Insurance Company," which stated, on the subject of overvaluation,
"The plaintiffs made and the defendants accepted the estimate; and
the contract was made on that basis. No fraud, concealment, or gam-
ing is suggested. We are all of the opinion that the plaintiffs are en-
titled to recover." The Hingham Insurance Company case was then
cited in Fuller v. Boston Fire Insurance Company,7 and in Wood on
Fire Insurance.8 Thus the modern rule was born.
Some cases pretended to abide by the settled rule that any material
overvaluation, whether fraudulent or innocent, would avoid the policy,
yet circumvented the rule in cases where it would work an injustice by
simply calling any overvaluation, even one of twofold the actual value,0
or of a third again actual value,10 an immaterial and unsubstantial
overvaluation.
A clear and typical clash of the two doctrines, the old and the new,
can be seen in the three Eakin cases, quite noted in their -day. The inter-
mediate court of appeals, citing the Massachusetts cases, supra, and
Wood on Fire Insurance, held that only an overvaluation so gross that
fraud must of necessity be presumed would vitiate the policy. 1 The
'*4 Pick (Mass.) 445, 21 Mass. 429 (1827). 2 MAY, INSURANCE (3d ed.,
1890), §373A, p. 827, n. 3, states that the modern rule was born in Texas. The
most diligent search by the author, however, would clearly give Massachusetts this
honor.
' 18 Pick (Mass.) 523, 35 Mass. 523 (1836). In the Borden case the question
was whether the value of the insured's interest in the protected property was
worth the full value of the face of the policy. There was no question as to the
value of the property itself. The court held that in the absence of fraud, insured
could recover the full face of the policy.
'4 Metc. (Mass.) 206, 45 Mass. 206 (1842).
'WooD, FIRE INSURANCE (1878) 431, §220, n. 6.
'Conn v. Imperial Fire Insurance Co., 1 R. & C. (Nova Scotia) 240.
"'Franklin Insurance Co. v. Vaughan, 92 U. S. 516, 23 L. ed. 740 (1876).
11 R. E. Eakin v. Home Insurance Co., 1 Tex. Civ. Cas. 155 (1883).
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highest appelate court reversed this holding, stating that any material
overvaluation, whether by mistake or fraud, would bar recovery on the
policy.
12
The old rule has still been followed in some comparatively recent
decisions.' 3
As to the case where there is a fraudulent overvaluation, the law
appears the same in nearly all cases, old and modem: If the mis-
valuation was material or substantial the policy is void; otherwise
not.14*
The change that has occurred in the law is clearly reflected by the
text writers, the early ones stating the "old" (now minority) rule, the
transition ones being rather confused, and the .recent writers stating
the modern majority rule.
The third edition of May on Insurance; published in 1891, follows
the earlier editions in stating that where the policy provides that over-
valuation will avoid it, then any substantial overvaluation, innocent or
fraudulent, will avoid the policy; and where the policy does not state
that overvaluation will avoid it, the same is true. However, May
recognizes that in the latter case there is a tendency to hold that only
gross innocent overvaluation will avoid the policy.15*
As late as 1921, Corpus Juris stated the law in accordance with
May above. A few pages later, however, it states that the "old" rule
applies only to warranties, and not to representations. A general con-
fusion of the cases on the matter is said to exist.:6
The fourth edition of Richards, in 1932, emphasized still another
way of dividing and distinguishing between the cases using the "old"
and the "new" rules: viz., that the "old" rule that an innocent over-
valuation would avoid the policy is still today the majority rule in
inarine insurance cases, while the "new" rule is the majority in other
types of property insurance cases. The reason, as indicated by Rich-
ards, is that a marine insurer is entitled to practically a guaranty of
"Home Insurance Co. v. R. E. Eakin, 2 Tex. Civ. App. Reps. 587 (1885).
's Smith v. Royal Insurance Co., 37 F. Supp. 841 (N. D. Cal. 1941).
14*2 MAY, INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1891), §373; 4 RIcHARDS, INSURANCE (4th ed.
1932), 363, §233; 26 CORPUS JuRas, FIR INSURANCE (1921), §189(b); VANCE,
INsURANcE (2d. ed. 1930), §190; 29 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, INSURANCE
(1940), §1132. But see Lycoming Insurance Co. v. Ruben, 79 Ill. 402 (1876),
and 4 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE (1942), §2601, to the effect that any fraudulent
overvaluation may avoid the policy, whether material or not.
11*2 MAY, INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1891), §§373-4. The case of Citizens Fire and
Marine Insurance Company v. Short, 62 Ind. 316 (1878), in discussing an identical
section from an earlier edition of May, criticized May's adherence to the "old"
rule: "It states the law on the subject of overvaluation more strongly in favor of
the insurer than we think the cases will warrant. In our opinion, the over-
valuation must be knowingly false and fraudulent, or it will not have the effect
of vitiating or avoiding the policy."
1626 CoRPUs JURIS, FIRE INSURANCE (1921) §§188-191, 205-6.
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the truthfulness of the insured's description of the protected property,
because in many cases the property may be overseas so that the insurer
has no opportunity to inspect it. This circumstance is said not to be
true of other forms of property insurance. Richards' conclusions seem
to be backed up by good case authority.
17
Vance, in 1930, seems to have committed the error of stating quite
bluntly in one place that the "old" Tule is the law (except as to mere
statements of opinion and belief), Is while several chapters later he
clearly states that the modem rule is in the majority.10 However,
Vance's point seems to be that all statements as to the value of prop-
erty must be treated as mere opinion, except valuations of items which
have a definite stipulated value (such as the value of a mortgage on the
insured property). Thus the inconsistency is largely explained away.
Patterson concurs with Vance's conclusion that statements of val-
uation are largely opinion, citing First National Bank of Kansas City
v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company.20 Hence the insurer can avoid
the policy only if there is a fraudulent misvaluation, which would in-
volve the considerable difficulty of proving that the insured did not
actually "think what he said he thought." Such a statement of opinion
is therefore "worthless," says Patterson, insofar as aiding the insurer
in litigation upon the policy.
21
Appleman on Insurance, 1941, presents a very discerning analysis
of the cases on this point.22 He begins by giving a general statement
of the "new" majority rule that a fraudulent and substantial overval-
uation will usually avoid the policy whereas an innocent one usually
will not. Appleman points out the confusion on the point of innocent
overvaluation, but states that the better modern courts realize that
statements of value are largely mere opinion and that nearly everyone
is inclined quite innocently to place an exaggerated value on his own
goods. These considerations, plus the fact that a court may always
fall back on the device of presuming fraud in case there is a very
grossly exaggerated value, have been the principal reasons for the
switch to the "new" rule. Appleman indicates, and with a substantial
backing of decisions, that innocent overvaluation is more apt to be
excused where the policy is of the "open" form than where it is
"valued." Nearly all policies today are "open" ones (another reason
for the switch to the new rule). Under such a policy the original state-
ment of value is not of importance in determining the amount that an
'7 RcHARDS, INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) §§79-80.
1 8
VANCE, INSURANcE (2d ed. 1930) §107, at p. 368.
1 9 VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §190, at p. 724.
2095 U. S. 673, 24 L. ed. 563 (1877).
21 PAERSON, INSURANCE (1935) §67, at p. 278.
224 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE (1941) §§2601-2.
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insurer must pay in the event of loss, for the insured is indemnified in
accordance with the value of the property at the time of the loss. The
original statement of value is therefore important only in determining
the amount of the premium, and because the moral hazard is thought
to be increased if property is insured for more than actual value. If
it is a valued policy, on the other hand, then the amount the insurer
must pay after a loss is calculated in accordance with the original
statement of value in the application for insurance. Courts are there-
fore much less willing to excuse an overvaluation in such a policy, and
much more willing to consider the overvaluation as fraudulent.2 * The
very fact that the policy is of the valued type is calculated to put the
insured on notice.that he must be especially careful and accurate in his
statement of value.
The sketch treatment of this subject in the American Jurisprudence
volume on Insurance seems well taken in so far as it goes.24 It is clearly
stated that the majority rule today is that an innocent overvaluation
will not avoid a policy of insurance. Also, it is well shown that geh-
erally it makes no difference, in cases concerning overvaluation of
property, whether the misstatement occurred in the proofs of loss, or
in the original application for the policy. The law is the same in both
cases.
25
Such, then, is the law as stated by the cases and the authorities
who have attempted to analyze them.
As to the present case, it should be noted at the outset that if the
insured is to be allowed any relief it cannot be by reformation of the
policy as sought by the plaintiff here. Some other basis for relief must
be found, such as that the mistake was of such nature that it will avoid
the policy; or that the authorities have generally allowed a return of
premiums when they "reopen" the valuation of a valued policy. For
the court in the principal case decided, and rightly so, that the insured
could not have had reformation here. "There was no agreement or
intention as to insurance of a necklace made of 'Japanese' or cultured
pearls; and if the contract should now be so reformed as to cover a
necklace of the latter character, it would be converted into something
which the parties never intended." While in a proper case equity may
8 See, infra, pp. 95 f., as to the right of the insurer to "reopen" the stipulated
valuation after a loss, if he feels there has been an overvaluation; and as to the
right of the insured, upon such "reopening," to recover excess premiums paid
because of an innocent overvaluation.
2 29 AMERICAN JURIsPRUDENcE, INSURANCE (1940) §§1132-4.
" Orenstein v. Star Insurance Co., 10 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926);
Columbian Insurance Co. v. Modem Laundry, 277 Fed. 355, 20 A. L. R. 1159
(C. C_. A. 8th, 1921); Erb v. German-American Insurance Co., 98 Iowa 606, 67
N. W. 583 (1896) ; Stone v. Hawkeye Insurance Co., 68 Iowa 737, 28 N. W. 47
(1886).
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reform a written contract which, because of a mistake or inadvertence
in drawing up the instrument-as a stenographical error, etc.-does
not express what the parties intended, it can do so only to the extent
of making it speak the actual agreement, and cannot make a new and
different contract for the parties.
The present case is an attempt by the insured to recover excess
premiums, rather than an attempt by the insurer to escape liability
because of misvaluation. However, whether or not these premiums can
be recovered depends upon whether or not the policy was valid, for it
is -the well-established rule in marine insurance that, with regard to
return of premiums for overinsurance, if the insurer could have at any
time and under any circumstances been called upon to pay the whole
sum on which he had received premiums, then the entire premium is
earned, and there can be no recovery of any part of it by the insured.
But if the insurer could never have been called upon to pay the whole,
then he must return an amount of the premium commensurate with
that percentage of the whole value of the insured property which he
could not have been forced to make good in case of a loss. 26 In short,
the insurer can usually keep the premiums only if he bore the risk. The
rule therefore is based upon failure of consideration.
2 7
It would seem that the insurer did not bear a risk in the present
case because if he had been sued on the policy there are several defenses
which he might have interposed so as to escape any payment. First, this
was a marine insurance policy. As stated, 28 the so-called "old" rule is
controlling in such a case. An innocent overvaluation, if substantial,
will avoid the policy. Second, in many cases where the valuation is
very greatly inaccurate (as in the present case, where a $60.00 neck-
lace was stated to be worth $60,000) the courts have adopted the device,
in order to prevent obvious injustice, of presuming fraud, so that the
policy is void under the universally accepted rule that a fraudulent sub-
stantial misstatement will avoid the policy. 29 And third, the policy in
the present case was a valued one. As stated,8 0 proper valuation is of
such importance in such a policy that the courts have generally expected
an applicant for insurance to be positive of the value of the protected
property. A substantial overvaluation, even an innocent one, will
usually avoid a valued policy.
The insurer may claim, however, and upon good authority, that
2 VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §92, at p. 322; 2 ARNOULD, MARINE IN-
SURANCE (11th ed. 1924) §1259.2 7 Tyrie v. Fletcher, 2 Cowp. 666, 98 Reprint 1297 (Eng. 1777); VANCE, IN-
SURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §93, at p. 321.
"See, supra, pp. 91 f., the summary of Richards' discussion.




these defenses do not render the policy absolutely void, but merely
voidable at his option so that until the insurer has exercised his option
(which naturally he did not do here) the policy must be treated as
valid and he must be regarded as having carried the risk.
1
This contention of the insurer may be discounted in several possible
ways. First, the language in many cases and texts seems to indicate
that a material misvaluation of the protected property in a marine
policy will cause the policy to be ab initio void (so that the risk never
attaches), and not merely voidable at the will of the insurer
3 2 *
And second, there is authority that the risk does attach, but that
nevertheless there may be a recovery of premiums commensurate with
the amount of overinsurance, by a "reopening" or reconsideration of
the value even in a valued policy. In Forbes v. Aspinwal,33 and Rick-
man v. Carstairs,S4 it was established that notwithstanding the fact that
" See, supra, n. 2.
2* For example, 4 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE (1941) §2601, states, "A gross
exaggeration of the value or substantial misstatement will relieve the insurer of
all liability thereunder." And 2 MAY, INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1891) §373, says, "It
is not necessary that the overvaluation be intentional and fraudulent to-have the
effect of vitiating the policy." Further, "For no overvaluation but a gross and
clear one ... will in either case be held to vitiate the policy; and such a one will
avoid the policy, whether provided against or not." And RIcHARDs, INSURANCE
(4th ed. 1932) §79, states, "In marine insurance, a concealment of a material
circumstance . . . whether intentional or unintentional, innocent or fraudulent,
avoids the contract." Further, "The validity of the marine policy impliedly is
conditioned upon the completeness and accuracy of the description of the char-
acter of the risk as put forth by the applicant."
And Merchants Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 219 App. Div. 636,
220 N. Y. S. 514 (1927), says, "The relationship between insurer and insured on
marine insurance is one which calls for nberrima fides." Further, Delaware In-
surance Co. v. 'Hill, 127 S. W. 283 (Tex. 1910) is to the effect that a valued
policy will be absolutely void if there is misrepresentation of value, provided
there is actual fraud, or such a gross misstatement of value that fraud may be
presumed. Also, see Tyrie v. Fletcher, 2 Comp. 666, 98 Reprint 1297 (Eng.
1777) ; Stevenson v. Snow, 3 Burr. 1240, 97 Reprint 809 (Eng. 1761) ; Martin v.
Sitwell, 1 Shower 156, 89 Reprint 509 (Eng. 1700) ; Colby v. Hunter, 3 C. & P. 7,
172 Reprint 298 (Eng. 1827).
However, see, supra, n. 2. And also to the contrary is the one case most
directly in point, Morrison v. The Universal Marine Insurance Co., 8 Exch. 197
(Eng. 1873). Plaintiff-insured's agent was instructed to secure marine insurance
on freight on the Cambria. The agent had been informed that the Cambria might
be grounded, there being some news to that effect. Upon careful investigation
the agent determined that the ship had not grounded, whereupon he applied for
the policy, not mentioning the supposedly false rumor. The insurer heard of
the rumor from another source shortly after receiving the application, but issued
the policy notwithstanding. Upon suit on the policy (the Cambria having in fact
been grounded and lost) held, the failure of the agent to mention the rumor made
the policy voidable at the option of the insurer. This option could be exercised
within a reasonable time after the insurer learns that it has cause to avoid.
Held, also, that the insurer's issuing the policy after hearing of the unconfirmed
rumor did not amount to an election not to avoid.
Also, see 38 CoRPus JuRis, MARINE INSURANCE (1921) §139; and 4 RICH-
ARDS, INSURANCE (4th ed 1932) §136.
" 13 East 323, 104 Reprint 394 (Eng. 1811).
8, 5 B. & Ad. 651, 110 Reprint 931 (Eng. 1833).
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the policies were "valued," the value would be "reopened," and the
insurer could show that the amount stated in the policy was not the true
amount on board ship at the time of the disaster at sea. In those cases
the boat owner insured his freight charge (Forbes case) and cargo
(Rickman case) before picking up the cargo, which then turned out to
be considerably smaller than anticipated. A loss at sea occurred. It
was held that the insurer had to pay, in the former case, freight charges
equivalent only to the actual charge that would have been due on the
smaller cargo, and, in the latter case, only the value of the actual
cargo.35* I
The case of The-Main;86 extended this doctrine by allowing the
insured a return of the extra premium that had been paid for the un-
necessary overinsurance. In this case, a ship operator took out in-
surance to make sure that he received his freight charge (which he
otherwise would not receive in case of a loss at sea). Before he set
sail, however, the owner of the cargo unexpectedly paid the ship
operator about one fourth of the freight charge, so that there ceased to
be any risk at all that such part of the charge would not be received.
A loss at sea occurred. The court held that the insurer was liable only
for the remainder of the freight charge, and also that the insured could
recover the excess premiums.37 * Also, in Fisk v. Masterman8 there
was overinsurance because of a mistake in good faith as to the size and
value of the cargo. Return of appropriate premium was allowedao*
New York has adopted for all types of property insurance cases the
"'The Forbes and Rickman cases conform to the general rule that the valua-
tion in a valued policy may be reopened where there is fraud or mistake; but
beyond this it may not be reopened, not even where there is only a par'tial loss.
Griswold v. Union Insurance Co., 11 Fed. Cas. 69, No. 5840 (C. C. N. Y. 1854);
Brooke v. Louisiana Insurance Co., 4 Mant. N. S. (La.) 640 (1826) ; Stanton v.
Natchez Insurance Co., 6 Miss. 340 (1844). See Hall v. Jefferson Insurance Co.,
279 Fed. 892 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Standard Marine Insurance Co. v. Nome
Beach Lighterage, 133 Fed. 636 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904); Muirhead v. Forth In-
surance Assoc., 1894 A. C. (Eng.) 72.
(1894) Prob. (Eng.) 320.
'" Despite the liberality of this case in allowing a return of the premium for
overinsurance caused by unexpected payment of freight, it strongly criticized the
Forbes case, supra, for recognizing any overinsurance in the case where, in a
valued policy, the parties had merely mistaken the size of the cargo. The Main
case stated that a court was not at liberty to reopen the valuation agreed upon
by the parties as an arbitrary and unchangeable figure. As to the merit of dis-
tinguishing between overvaluation caused by unexpected payment of the freight
charge and that caused by mistake as to the value of the cargo, query. See dis-
cussion of Fisk v. Masterman, supra.
38 8 M. & W. 165, 151 Reprint 994 (Eng. 1841).
'"When the voyage began, there was no overinsprance. But while the ship
was on the high seas additional insurance was secured with another company, on
a mistaken belief that the cargo was of greater value than it actually was. Held,
only the second insurance company must return excess premiums to the insured;
for the first insurer bore the entire risk for at least a part of the voyage, so is
not liable for returning a ratable share of the premium paid for overinsurance.
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wise custom of refusing to consider a valued policy void when there
is an innocent overvaluation; but instead, that state merely sets aside
the stated value, and awards recovery on the policy to the insured on
the basis of a smaller and more accurate valuation. 40  This in effect
converts a valued policy into an open one, except that the valuation
has to be calculated, in such a case, by reference back to the time the
policy was taken out, rather than as of the time the loss occurred. Also,
Ohio has adopted a statute requiring every fire insurer to have an agent
appraise the value of the property at the time the policy is renewed ;41
and under such a statute of course a misstatement of value by the in-
sured would not be held to avoid the policy.
42
Finally, regardless of whether or not the insurer exercised his
option to void the policy, it would appear that there was such a mistake
here that the insured himself should be allowed to avoid it. As stated
by the Restatement of Contracts,4 3 * ". . . where parties on entering
into a transaction that affects their contractual relations are both under
a mistake regarding a fact assumed by them as the basis on which they
entered into the transaction, it is voidable by either party if enforce-
ment of it would be materially more onerous to him than it would have
been had the fact been as the parties believed it to be . . .,,44* (with
o Huth v. New York Insurance Co., 21 N. Y. Super. Ct. 538, 8 Bos. 538
(1861)."6 OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1937) §9583. The effect of this statute is to
make all five policies, which are renewed, valued policies. Originally the statute
applied to original issues as well as renewals.
112 Queens Insurance Co. v. Leslie, 47 Ohio St. 409, 24 N. E. 1072 (1890).
' RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAc'rs (1932) §502. This section begins by stating
that it shall be applicable notwithstanding the fact that there is no such mistake
as would render the original offer void, or render the contract void as ambiguous,
or render the contract void because of impossibility not foreseen or reasonably
foreseeable by the promisor.
" This section of the Restatement is in accord with the general case law.
Relief for mistake (cancellation, rescission, reformation, etc.) is allowed where
there is a mistake going "to the essence" of the subject matter of a contract.
Fritzler v. Robinson, 70 Iowa 500, 31 N. W. 61 (1886); Hecht v. Batheller,
147 Mass. 335, 17 N. E. 651 (1888) ; McKay v. Coleman, 85 Mich. 60, 48 N. W.
203 (1891); Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N. W. 919 (1887); Costello
v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 172 N. W. 907 (1919) ; Du Pont Chemical Co. v. Buck-
ley, 96 N. J. Eq. 465, 126 Atl. 674 (1924); McCaull-Webster Co. v. Steele
Brothers, 43 S. D. 485, 180 N. W. 782 (1921).
Relief is also generally allowed where there was a mistake in counting, or
other mathematical computation. Miller v. First Savings Bank, 90 Cal. App.
387, 266 Pac. 294 (1928); Freeman v. Ralph Realty Corp., 198 App. Div. 788,
191 N. Y. S. 72 (1921); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS (2nd ed. 1938) §1574, n. 1;
Annotation: 59 A. L. R. at 825, 830.
Relief is frequently denied where it would result in placing the defendant in a
worse position than he was in originally-as, for instance, where he has per-
formed services or entered into contractual obligations which he otherwise would
not have undertaken, on the assumption that he was rightfully entitled to the
assets which the plaintiff seeks to recover from him. Grymes v. Saunders, 93
U. S. 55, 23 L. ed. 798 (1876); Olson v. Shephard, 165 Minn. 433, 206 N. W.
711 (1926) ; Harper v. Newburgh, 159 App. Div. 695, 145 N. Y. S. 59 (1913):
Murray v. Saunderson, 62 Wash. 477, 114 Pac. 424 (1911).
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three exceptions not applicable here) .4 " All of the requisites for the
application of this section are present in the principal case: (1) The
mistaken fact was the basis on which the parties bargained. It was a
material mistake affecting the identity and attributes of the subject
matter of the contract.46  (2) The mistake was harmful to the insured
to the extent of over $2,000.47 (3) The insured is willing to pay
premiums on the true ($61.50) value of the necklace. (This require-
ment is generally a condition precedent to relief for mistake.) 4
8
However, the contention of the insurer in this case is that to judge
the case on the established rules concerning return of premiums and
void policies is to beg the entire question, for this case contains, says
the Orient Insurance Company, a special equity which makes the estab-
lished law inapplicable-namely, that regardless of legal theories, the
insurance company did actually, as a practical matter, bear a risk here-
for if the insured property were at the bottom of the ocean, then the
insurance company could never prove, save perhaps by sending divers
to the bottom, that the pearls were worth only $60.00 instead of
$60,000. Hence the Orient Company says it is entitled to a premium
commensurate with the $60,000 risk borne.
It would seem that the present case is incorrect in allowing this
contention of the insurer to control the decision. No reason is shown
why the insurer could not have obtained the second protocol from Ger-
many-the one subsequently obtained by the insurer, in which the
German commissioner admitted his original mistake in stating the
value of the pearls, and restated their true value at $61.50. And not
even this would have been necessary if there had been a disaster in
which the pearls were merely partially lost, or crushed, or otherwise
damaged, but not sunk. In short, this present case is no different from
any other in which owners take out marine insurance that their goods
in distant parts of the world will be safely transported. 40 * Every in-
surer, and in fact every litigant, must run the risk of not being able to
find evidence to prove his defenses.
Although this was a valued policy, the insurer could not very well
'*The second exception is where the party seeking to avoid the transaction
can obtain satisfaction by reformation. See, supra, pp. 93 f., to the effect that this
exception would not apply here.
" See RESTATEMENT, CoNmAcrs (1932) §502, comment a.
," Id., comment b. "Id., comment c.
'" For example, see the Forbes, Rickman, Mah, and Fisk cases, supra.
If the Orient Insurance Co. was seeking to change the existing law, would
the following line of argument have been more effective? The owner of property
generally has, even in cases such as the present, a better chance of obtaining,
and more likelihood of knowing, the value of the protected property than the
insurer, who in practically every case has never had any dealings with such
property before-so that the policy of the courts should be to make the owner
bear the loss caused by overvaluation, where the property is in a distant country,
and not available for inspection.
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contend, in the face of the Forbes and Rickman cases, that he could not
"reopen" the value so as to offer his evidence that the pearls were of
lesser value. MILTON SHORT.
Taxation-Powers of Appointment-Will Contests-Taxation
of Property Passing under Compromise of Attempted
Testamentary Exercise of Power of Appointment
Decedent, Zachary Smith Reynolds, died at the age of twenty,
being at that time the beneficiary of three trusts set up by the deed
and wills of his parents. One trust directed that he receive the income
until he reached 28 years of age, at which time he became outright owner;
from the other trusts he was to receive income for life. All three
trusts gave him a general testamentary power of appointment over the
trust property whereby he could, in his sole discretion, appoint to any-
one. In default of exercise of the power, the property was to go to
his descendants, or if he had none, to his brother and sisters and their
issue per stirpes. Decedent's attempt to exercise the power in favor
of his brother and sisters by a New York will was contested by his two
children who (1) denied the validity of the New York will and, (2)
challenging the right of the brother and sisters to take in default,
asserted their own right to do so. The brother and sisters claimed
under decedent's will and in the alternative as takers in default, con-
tending that one child was precluded because of a prior separation
agreement and the other by reason of illegitimacy. These issues were
never finally resolved by judicial decision, and eventually a compromise
was entered into under which 37312% of the trust property went to
the brother and sisters. In a 5 to 4 decision'" the Supreme Court de-
l* Helvering v. Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, - U. S. -,
62 S. Ct. 925, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 851 (1942). Both the majority and minority
agreed that if the power of appointment were unexercised decedent did not have
such an interest in the trust property as to require its inclusion in his gross estate
under §302(a). This conclusion was based upon the legislative history of the
statute and upon implicationg from United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41 S. Ct.
256, 65 L. ed. 617 (1921), rather than upon the economic equivalence of decedent's
rights to complete ownership. Thus the court refused to expand the scope of
§302(a) by the concept of "sibstantial ownership" which is developing under
§22(ay for income tax purposes. 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
(1942) §4.12, p. 223. Except for the unavailability of the corpus, the ordinary life
estate coupled with a general power of appointment closely resembles a fee simple.
For this reason, the inclusion of such property under §302(a), even though the
power be unexercised, would perhaps have been not unreasonable, especially inas-
much as by so doing the court, at one stroke, could have escaped the complicated
question of apportionment raised by their actual decision, and also laid at rest any
possible doubt concerning the constitutionality of the taxation under the 1942
Revenue Act of property subject to an unexercised power of appointment. See
Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Company (1941-1943) C. C. H. Inheritance
Tax Service-State, 190, 530 (Ky. 1942), where the court at the end of its
opinion expresses doubts as to the ability of the legislature to tax property subject
to an unexercised power as a part of the donee's estate.
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